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CARTE BLANCHE FOR CRUELTY:
THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
Katharine M. Swanson*
This Note explores both the judicial and administrative underenforcement of the
Animal Welfare Act in protecting the welfare of laboratory animals used for
purposes of experimentation. Specifically, the Note suggests that judicial underen-
forcement is borne as a result of the difficulties of lodging a private cause of action
under the Act or gaining standing under the alternative statutory scheme of the
Administrative Procedure Act. It further suggests administrative underenforcement
in describing the promulgated regulations of the Act as inadequate and the lack of
self-policing mechanisms. Finally, the Note suggests some ways that enforcement
can be made more effective in these two areas.
Whenever people say "we mustn't be sentimental," you can
take it that they are about to do something cruel. And if they
add, "we must be realistic," they mean they are going to make
money out of it.'
I tremble for my species when I reflect that God isjust.2
Donna, a thirty-six year old chimpanzee, died recently in the
Coulston Foundation, a federally funded research laboratory, after
carrying a dead fetus in her womb for almost two months." She had
a liter of pus in her peritoneal cavity and the partially decomposed
fetus's head was visible through the tear in the ruptured uterus.4 A
reviewing veterinarian stated that it was clear "that Donna must
have suffered excruciating pain."" Donna was used for breeding,
not for actual experimentation, and so she was nominally
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magna cum laude, College of William and Mary; J.D. 2001, magna cum laude, University of
Michigan Law School. Attorney, Arnold & Porter, New York, NY. I would like to thank
Professor Bob Kuehn of Tulane University Law School and the Journal of Law Reform for their
assistance in the development and publication of this Note and Animal Legal Defense Fund
for the inspiration. I also want to express my love and gratitude to Mom, Dad, and Nathan
for their unfailing love and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to Terri and Cleo and to
the memory ofJennie and Sandy.
1. ANIMAL LIBERATION ACTION, BEYOND MIGHT MAKES RIGHT 8 (1994) (quoting
Brigid Brophy).
2. STEPHANIE LALAND, PEACEFUL KINGDOM: RANDOM ACTS OF KINDNESS BY ANIMALS
110 (1997) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
3. Adam M. Roberts, Coulston's Killing Fields: Death Toll Mounts at TCF, ANIMAL WEL-
FARE INST. Q., Fall/Winter 1999-2000, at 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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protected from such pain under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).6
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was aware of
the Coulston Foundation's AWA violations that resulted in the
deaths of two other chimpanzees and began investigations in
March 1998. Since that time, Donna and five other chimpanzees
have died due to inadequate veterinary care, indicating that the
USDA's investigations have not helped the animals that they were
mandated to protect.
7
Donna's torturous death is not an isolated incident at the Coul-
ston Foundation, or at the thousands of other research facilities in
the United States. The AWA is egregiously underenforced, espe-
cially in research laboratories. This Note addresses the
underenforcement in research laboratories. Part I discusses the
creation and evolution of the AWA through its successive iterations
over the past thirty-five years. Part II explores the problems with
judicial enforcement of the AWA, focusing on the lack of a private
cause of action under the Act and the difficulties for potential
plaintiffs in gaining standing to attack the AWA under the alterna-
tive statutory scheme of the Administrative Procedure Act. Part III
illustrates the problems with administrative enforcement of the
AWA, which include the Department of Agriculture's failure to
promulgate and enforce adequate regulations pursuant to the Act,
the inherent difficulties of the AWA's self-policing mechanisms for
research facilities, and judicial unwillingness to correct the
agency's failure to regulate and punish violations of the AWA. Part
IV concludes with suggestions for reforming the AWA and its en-
forcement mechanisms in ways that will satisfy its goal of protecting
animals' welfare.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
[W] e turn God's creations into piteous and abject creatures of
fear and misery whose only recourse is to stare at man in sul-
len hatred and then to die. 9
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. The AWA also regulates exhibition of animals, transportation and handling of
animals in interstate commerce, and dealers who buy or sell animals for profit when they are
intended for use in research, teaching, exhibition, or as pets. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2132 (1994).
9. 116 CONG. REc. 31,525, 31,526 (1970) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but,
Can they suffer.' °
Animals have been used in scientific research since the third
century B.C. in a quest to discover answers about human biology
and medical problems, and more recently, to test the safety of con-
sumer products." Proponents of such animal research argue that
human life is more important than the lives of animals, so pain or
death of an animal in research that may lead to avoidance or cur-
tailment of human suffering is justified.12 Because continuing the
status quo of animal experimentation is viewed as less costly than
investigating alternatives, "institutionalized animal exploitation is
permitted because society has determined that economic efficiency
outweighs the inhumanity of an animal's suffering or death.' ' 13 Op-
ponents contend that any creature capable of suffering should not
be deliberately subjected to pain for human benefit simply because
humans think the ends justify the means.14 Many. opponents of
animal testing thus argue that in working towards the ultimate goal
of banning all animal experimentation, such testing must be moni-
tored and regulated to "prevent all inhumane treatment of
animals, not just treatment that is unjustified or unnecessary.,15
The AWA was enacted in 1966 as the Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act (LAWA), primarily aiming to prevent companion animals 16
from being stolen from their homes and sold to research facili-
ties. 7 Its preamble stated that its primary purpose was "to protect
the owners of dogs and cats from theft of such pets," and its secon-
dary and tertiary purposes were to prevent the sale or use of stolen
pets and ensure humane treatment in research facilities.' LAWA
also authorized the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) to is-
sue licenses to animal dealers and to promulgate regulations
10. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 310-11 (1780), quoted in ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL
RIGHTS xiii (1990) (emphasis in original).
11. ANDREW ROWVAN, OF MICE, MODELS, AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANI-
MAL RESEARCH 42 (1984).
12. ANIMAL LIBERATION ACTION, supra note 1, at 6-7.
13. Carole Lynn Nowicki, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 SETON HALL
LEGIS.J. 443, 449-50 (1999).
14. ANIMAL LIBERATION ACTION, supra note 1, at 5.
15. Nowicki, supra note 13, at 490.
16. A companion animal is an animal of a species commonly considered to be a pet.
17. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350(1966) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994 & Supp. V)).
18. Id. § 1, 80 Stat. at 350 (emphasis added).
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dictating minimum handling and treatment standards.' 9 One con-
gressman expressed concern that "[o]ur nation has a moral
obligation to eliminate animal suffering wherever it is possible to
do so without impeding legitimate research., 20 A senator observed
that "enactment of legislation to ... provide for the humane
treatment for those animals legitimately used for such [research]
purposes is absolutely necessary. Such humane legislation will in
no way deter the advance of medical science. To the contrary, it will
eliminate needless brutality."21 Such views were not reflected in
LAWA, whose laboratory coverage was "little more than a token
gesture."22 The LAWA was extremely limited in scope, regulating
only the use of "live dogs, cats, monkeys. . ., guinea pigs, hamsters,
and rabbits., 23 Additionally, it expressly stated that the Secretary
was not authorized to "prescribe standards for the handling, care,
or treatment of animals during actual research or experimenta-
tion."24 Also, although LAWA required the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), an enforcement division of the
USDA, to inspect research facilities, it did not stipulate the fre-
quency of such inspections. 5
The Animal Welfare Act of 1970 (AWA of 1970) was passed to
amend the LAWA, including some attention to the humane con-
cerns of those Congressmen that "the unbelievable brutality we
inflict on mammals and birds ... is a national disgrace."26 The
Congressional Record on the AWA of 1970 stated that the purpose
of this legislation was to:
establish by law the humane ethic that animals should be ac-
corded the basic creature comforts.... The bill in no manner
authorizes the disruption or interference with any scientific
research or experimentation.... This Committee and Con-
gress, however, expect that the work that's done behind that
27laboratory door will be done with compassion and with care.
The AWA of 1970 "elaborates in greater detail the standards to
be promulgated and extends coverage to any warm-blooded ani-
19. Id. § 13, 80 Stat. at 352.
20. 112 CONG. REc. 19,559 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
21. 112 CONG. REC. 7,380 (statement of Sen. Young).
22. 112 CONG. REC. 19,608 (statement of Rep. Pepper).
23. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 2 (h).
24. Id. § 18, 80 Stat. at 352.
25. Id. § 16, 80 Stat. at 352.
26. 116 CONG. REc. 31,525 (1970) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
27. H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103-04.
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mal"28 whom the Secretary determines "is being used, or is in-
tended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, or
exhibition purposes, or as a pet," thereby expanding coverage be-
yond the research domain.2" This version of the Act also directed
the Secretary to promulgate standards for "basic creature com-
forts" for laboratory animals. 30 The legislation also instituted fines
for people who interfered with APHIS inspectors1 and required
the Secretary to report annually to Congress regarding licenses
and inspections of facilities.32
3'In 1975, further amendments outlawed animal fighting and re-
stated Congress's commitment to "humane care and treatment" of
animals used in, or intended for, research.34 Although Congress
rewrote the preamble to the AWA to reprioritize its purposes as
first ensuring humane treatment of animals in research facilities,
followed by assuring humane transportation of animals, and finally
protection of pet owners from theft, the revised AWA continued to
defer completely to the research community in allowing it to de-
termine humaneness without interference.0 These amendments
continued the LAWA's aversion to regulating testing, stating that
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing the Sec-
retary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to
design, outlines, guidelines, or performance of actual research or
experimentation."3 6
The 1985 amendments (known as the Improved Standards for
Laboratory Animals Act (ISLAA) ),37 were the last substantial modi-
fication of the AWA, essentially generating the version of the
28. 116 CONG. REC. 31,525 (1970) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
29. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, § 3(g), 84 Stat. 1560, 1561 (1970)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 21321(1994)).
30. H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, at 2. The House decreed "a statutory mandate that small
helpless creatures deserve the care and protection of a strong and enlightened public." Id.
31. See Animal Welfare Act of 1970 § 16(b). Penalties consisted of up to a $5,000 fine
and three years imprisonment for unarmed interference; $10,000 and ten years for armed.
See id.
32. Id. § 25, 84 Stat. 1565.
33. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279 § 26, 90 Stat. 417
(codified as amended 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (1994)). Animal fighting refers to "any event which
involves a fight between at least two animals and is conducted for purposes of sport, wager-
ing, or entertainment," but excluding hunting. 7 U.S.C. § 215 6 (g)(1). Animals used
frequently in fighting include cocks, bulls, and dogs. See e.g., PAMELA D. FRASCH ET AL., ANI-
MAL LAW 760-72 (2000).
34. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, § 1 (b) (2) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1994)).
35. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 195 (1995).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (6) (A).
37. Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2158-2159 (1994).
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statute which is in force presently. s These amendments were gen-
erated against the backdrop of several high profile cases in which
federally funded research laboratories were shown to have engaged
in cruelty toward their animals.9 ISLAA's touchstone is internal
review and policing, spearheaded by the creation of Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) . 4 Every facility cov-
ered by the AWA is required to create at least one IACUC
consisting of at least three members, one of whom must be a vet-
erinarian, and one of whom must be unconnected with the
research facility and theoretically able to represent animal welfare
concerns. 4 1 IACUCs must inspect their facilities semi-annually and
prepare reports on the inspections explaining violations of stan-
dards and deviations from approved protocols, including any
minority views of IACUC members.42 If the IACUC finds any prob
lems it notifies the facility, and if the facility fails to remedy the
situation, the IACUC notifies APHIS and any federal funding
43agencies. No remedy is specified in statute or regulations to cor-
rect potential problems of IACUC intractability or noncompliance.
In addition, each facility is required to submit its own annual re-
port to the Secretary containing assurances that the principal
researcher considered alternatives to any painful procedures, as-
surances of compliance with ISLAA § 2143, and explanations of
any deviations from standards.44 These reporting requirements di-
38. Subsequent amendments sought to curb the practice of selling stolen companion
animals to research facilities (pound seizure) through mandatory holding periods for
pounds and other animal dealers. See generally AWA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
39. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 196. The two most prominent such cases involved
Edward Taub, discussed infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text, and Thomas Gen-
narelli's University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinical Research Laboratory. Gennarelli's
experimentation, designed to develop a reproducible head injury model in baboons, in-
volved accelerating an animal's head at extremely high speeds in order to damage the brain.
FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 179. Videotapes of the experiments taken by the researchers
themselves showed researchers accidentally severing a baboon's ear with a hammer and
chisel while trying to remove a stone helmet, smoking and using unsterilized equipment
during surgery, and teasing and mocking the animals during experimentation. See id.; e.g.
Videotape: Unnecessary Fuss (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 1984) (tran-
scripts on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). National Institutes of Health
continued funding Gennarelli for a year after the videotape was made public, then con-
cluded that the researchers' egregious conduct was a "material failure to comply" with the
AWA and suspended research indefinitely. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 181-82; e.g. U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH/NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, Evaluation of Experimental Procedures
Conducted at the University of Pennsylvania Experimental Head Injury Laboratory 1981-1984 in
Light of the Public Health Service Animal Welfare Policy, 5 (July 17, 1985).
40. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1) (1994).
41. See id.
42. Id. § 2143(b) (3)-(4) (A).
43. Id. § 2143(b) (4) (C).
44. Id. § 2143 (a) (7) (A)-(B).
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rect that painful procedures should not be permitted without anes-
thetic unless the pain is necessary to the experiment and the
experimenter has "considered" alternatives.'
Finally, the Secretary is directed to promulgate minimum re-
quirements for the exercise of dogs, for "a physical environment
adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates,"
and for care, treatment, and pain and distress minimization of ex-
perimental animals. 6 However, the section of the earlier Act
prohibiting the Secretary from interfering in actual research de-
sign has been retained in its entirety.
47
II. PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
[T]hese little animals, however worthless they may be, have a
way of endearing themselves.48
This case involves animals, a subject that should be of great
importance to all humankind .
A. No Private Cause of Action Under the AWA
Very few cases have ever been litigated under the AWA; only one
of these ever reached beyond standing issues to the merits of the
case.5 The AWA offers no explicit citizen suit provision akin to
those in many environmental statutes.) In a dramatically
45. Id.
46. Id. § 2143(a) (2) (B)-(3) (A).
47. See ISLAA, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat. 1354, 1654 (1985); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2143(a) (6) (A) (i). Also, the Secretary is not authorized "during inspection, to interrupt
the conduct of actual research or experimentation." Id. § 2143(6) (A) (iii).
48. Miller v. State, 63 S.E. 571, 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).
49. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 943 E Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1996) (Glickman
I), vacated by panel, 130 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated en banc, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1998), revd and vacated in part, 204 E3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
50. Thirty cases have been litigated under the AWA since its passage: fifteen appeals of
administrative actions, six preemption issues, two procedural issues, six cases regarding
failure to enforce which never reached beyond standing issues, one case that was settled
after the plaintiff was granted standing, and one case actually deciding failure to enforce.
51. See, e.g. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); Federal Water Pollu-
tion Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604,
9659 (2000). Citizen suits are "lawsuits by private individuals as a complement to the author-
ity" of the federal government to enforce or compel enforcement of a federal law. Int'l
SUMMER 2002] 943
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publicized case, the Fourth Circuit held in 1986 that the AWA
offers no such private cause of action to individuals. 2 In
International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral
Research, a group of individual and organizational plaintiffs claimed
that a research laboratory was in violation of the AWA by failing to
provide adequate food, water, sanitation, and veterinary care to its
monkey subjects. 53 Plaintiffs sought no damages in the case, but
instead designation as guardians of the seventeen monkeys, two of
whom died as the case was pending.54 The court held that the
plaintiffs could claim no cause of action under the AWA because
"Congress intended the administrative remedy to be the exclusive
remedy."5 5 The opinion underscores two purposes of the AWA: "a
commitment to administrative supervision of animal welfare" and
"subordination of such supervision to the continued independence
of research scientists" such that "enforcement authority does not
56extend to the confiscation of animals in use" or to private citizens.
The court explained that a private cause of action could
undermine predictability of enforcement, deter scientists from
research, and that discovery was too burdensome to add to the
existing administrative inspection process. 7 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari of the case without comment and the issue has
not since been challenged, nor has the AWA been amended to
create a private cause of action.
The frank admission of the D.C. Circuit Court, which has han-
dled almost all AWA cases, is disturbing because it has held that the
enforcement of the AWA must be subordinated to the independ-
ence of the regulated community, demonstrating an acceptance of
an extremely broad reading of § 2143(a) (6) (A) (i) that leaves no
room for enforcement. That the court condones the entire abdica-
tion of administrative supervision leaves no possibility of suit to
compel enforcement under the AWA even if a private cause of ac-
tion existed.
Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 934, 940 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
52. Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 940. The court also stated that the case could
be dismissed on alternate grounds for lack of standing. Id. at 941.
53. Id. at 936.
54. Id. at 937.
55. Id. at 940.
56. Id. at 939.
57. Id.
58. The Secretary is not authorized to "promulgate rules, regulations, or orders for the
handling, care, [or treatment of animals] during actual research or experimentation ..."
LAWA, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 13, 80 Stat. 350, 352 (1966) (codified as 7 U.S.C.
§ 2143(1994)).
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B. The APA Route: Standing Problems
With the possibility of suit under the AWA itself eliminated, pri-
vate plaintiffs have turned to suing the USDA under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failure to promulgate and
enforce adequate regulations pursuant to the AWA. The AWA di-
rects the Secretary to promulgate minimum requirements for the
"humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of ani-
mals."59 Until 1998, all such cases-Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy
(Espy I), 6 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy (Espy JI),6 ' and Interna-
tional Primate2--failed due to summarily determined lack of
standing for the plaintiffs to bring suit.63 In order to show stand-
ing, 4 a plaintiff must show (1) "that she has suffered injury in fact;"
(2) "that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions;"
and (3) "that a favorable judicial ruling will likely redress the plain-
tiff's injury;" as well as ensuring that her grievance "must arguably
fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statu-
tory provision ... invoked in the suit." 5 In Espy I, Animal Legal
Defense Fund, an animal welfare organization, challenged the
USDA's exclusion of birds, rats, and mice from its regulations con-
cerning laboratory animal welfare pursuant to the AWA. 66 In Espy II,
the Animal Legal Defense Fund condemned the USDA's lack of
specificity in promulgating regulations mandating the care of ani-
mals,67 exercise of dogs, the physical environmental enrichment of
primates, 68 and IACUC composition and duties. 9 In both Espy
cases, as in International Primate, the court failed to reach the mer-
its. They dismissed the cases after fairly cursory discussions of
standing, reiterating that such plaintiffs' injuries are not "presently
59. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
60. 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Espy]).
61. 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Espy I).
62. 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
63. See Espy I, 23 F.3d at 503; Espy II, 29 E3d at 724; Int'l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at
940.
64. Standing refers to the determination whether the plaintiff is the appropriate per-
son or organization to bring suit, a necessary prerequisite to filing any lawsuit in a case
governed by statute.
65. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Glickman
III), rev'd and vacated in part, 204 E3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 162 (1997)). "[Z]one of interests" refers to "those [interests] that Congress sought to
benefit through the AWA." Glickman III, 154 F.3d. at 445.
66. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (1994); see infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
67. 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (a)(1) (1994).
68. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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suffered or imminently threatened" by the speculative possibility of
injury from vague regulations.70
In 1996, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman (Glickman 1),
four individual plaintiffs and Animal Legal Defense Fund sued the
USDA under the APA for failure to adequately promulgate specific
minimum standards to compel a Long Island zoo to comply with
the AWA.71 In this case, Animal Legal Defense Fund and three indi-
vidual plaintiffs who were frequent zoogoers challenged the
USDA's regulation concerning environments adequate to promote
the psychological well-being of primates for failing to provide
minimum requirements and impermissibly delegating its congres-
sionally mandated responsibility to create such standards.72 The
district court held that all plaintiffs had standing to sue.73 In Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman (Glickman I), however, a panel of the
circuit court vacated the decision and held that all plaintiffs lacked
standing because "[i]t is part of the price of living in society ...
that an individual will observe conduct that he or she dislikes" and
that such discomfort does not constitute injury in fact.74 In addi-
tion, the court held that the government's failure to promulgate
regulations was too attenuated from the plaintiffs' injury to satisfy
causation, and that redressability was similarly unsatisfied because
plaintiffs did not "demonstrate that their painful memories are
likely to be obliterated by compelling the Secretary to promulgate
new legal regulations.
75
In a landmark 1998 decision, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glick-
man (Glickman III), the D.C. Circuit Court reviewed the case en banc
and determined that one of the individual plaintiffs, Marc Jurnove,
76did indeed have standing to sue. Citing the Supreme Court's ex-
plicit recognition of aesthetic interests in observing animals as
"undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,",7 the
70. Id. at 500; see also Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, 799
F.2d 934, 937-40 (4th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987); Espy II, 29 F.3d 720, 723-
26 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
71. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 943 F.Supp. 44, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Glickman
I).
72. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Glickman 1M).
73. See Glickman I, 943 F.Supp. at 53-57.
74. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 130 F.3d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated en
banc, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998), revd and vacated in part, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Glickman 11).
75. Id. at 469-70.
76. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Glick-
man III) (conferring standing onJumove, the court did not reach decisions on standing for
the other individual plaintiffs).
77. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
[VOL. 35:4
S Carte Blanche for Cruelty
court here held that Jurnove's injury satisfied all prongs of the
standing inquiry."' Jurnove fulfilled the injury in fact requirement
by suffering in a "personal and individual way.., by seeing with his
own eyes the particular animals whose condition caused him aes-
thetic injury," whom he has visited frequently and regularly. 9 The
court considered Jurnove's injury particularly cognizable because
he had worked for animal relief and rescue organizations
throughout his adult life, so was particularly empathetic to animals'
needs.80 The court found causation in that the USDA's "current
regulations allow the conditions that allegedly caused Mr.
Jurnove ['s] injury,"8' citing Supreme Court precedent that the cau-
sation prong is met when a plaintiff shows that his injury was
caused by agency authorization of otherwise illegal conduct.
2
Finally, Jurnove's injury was sufficiently redressable because "he has
a current routine of regularly visiting the Game Farm [private facil-
ity for animals] and provides a finite time period within which he
will make his next visit," so that USDA's promulgation of stricter
regulations "would necessarily alleviate Jurnove's aesthetic injury
during his planned, future trips to the Game Farm.8s3 Conse-
quently, Jurnove was granted standing to proceed to the merits of
814his claim.
C. Glickman: Miracle or Mirage?
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman has been lauded as "[t] he
[d]ecision [a]nimal [w]elfare [p]laintiffs [h]ave [b]een [w]aiting
[f] or," and at first examination, it appears to be a complete break-
through for such plaintiffs.8s However, the reasoning relied upon
by the majority in granting standing to Jurnove is extremely nar-
row. The holding relies heavily on the fact that Jurnove was a
frequent visitor to particular animals at the zoo and that he had
concrete plans to continue those visits.16 Standing conferred by
78. See Glickman III, 154 F.3d at 429.
79. Id. at 433.
80. See id. at 429.
81. Id. at 439.
82. Id. at 440 (citingSimon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 429.
85. Rob Roy Smith, Standing on Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal Welfare Litiga-
tion AfterAnimal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. N Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L. 989, 1003 (1999).
86. See Glickman III, 154 F.3d at 432, 443.
StuMMER 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
such criteria must necessarily extend to a fairly small class of poten-
tial plaintiffs because many people who encounter inhumane
treatment of animals and seek to alleviate it do not have the time
or resources to continue regular visits and make definitive plans to
do so into the future.
Furthermore, instances of animal maltreatment in research
laboratories and other private facilities that are not open for mem-
bers of the public are probably beyond the scope of this decision.
Within such settings, researchers, their staffs, and other IACUC
members are the only individual citizens who are permitted easy
access to animal subjects, and it is unlikely that they would seek
stricter regulations when they are conducting experiments under
inhumane conditions. LACUC members within research facilities
seeking standing have been unable to persuade courts that the
USDA's failure to promulgate adequate regulations to guide them
makes them unable to fulfill their statutory duties of enforcing the
AWA and is a sufficient injury in fact.8 7 This result is unlikely to
change under the Glickman ruling unless IACUC members begin
regular visitations with all individual animals whom they seek to
protect, a very unlikely possibility based on the large numbers of
animals in most facilities. Additionally, IACUC members have little
incentive to act as whistleblowers because they are provided no
protection from their facility's resulting retaliation. 8s
Organizational plaintiffs 9 are also not served by the Glickman
ruling. The earlier Espy Court held that to pass the zone of inter-
ests standing hurdle, an organization "must show a congressional
intent to benefit the organization or some indication that the or-
ganization is a peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative
neglect."90 Although animal welfare organizations appear to be
ideal challengers of the USDA's failure to protect animals, the
court held that "[t]he evident congressional intent to entrust to
the committees [IACUCs] the functions of oversight ... precludes
any inference that other private advocacy organizations" are ade-
87. See Animal Legal Def Fund v. Espy, 23 E3d496,501 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Espy 1).
88. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
89. An organization may have standing to sue on one of two bases. It may have repre-
sentational standing on behalf of its members if it shows that "(1) the interests the
organization seeks to protect are germane to its organizational purposes; (2) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit; and (3) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right."
Glickman I, 943 ESupp. 44, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477
U.S. 274, 275 (1986)). Alternatively, an organization may claim standing "in its own right to
seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate the rights and immunities itself may
enjoy." Glickman I, 943 ESupp. at 52 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
90. Espy 1, 23 F.3d at 503 (internal quotations omitted).
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quate challengers for the purpose of zone of interests determina-
tions.91 The Glickman case does not detract from the earlier ruling,
denying standing to the organizational plaintiff on the very similar
basis of failing to state a violation of requirements which were "de-
signed to protect some threatened concrete interest of the
plaintiff."9'
The case has been followed once, but its narrow holding was not
expanded by the later case.93 In Alternatives Research and Develop-
ments Foundation v. Glickman, a non-profit organization, a private
firm, and an individual plaintiff challenged the USDA's exclusion
of birds, rats, and mice from the scope of the AWA.94 The court al-
lowed the individual plaintiff, who worked in a laboratory with rats,
to survive a motion for summary judgment because of her aesthetic
interest in the rodents' treatment that stemmed from her personal
contact with them, explicitly analogizing her situation to Jurnove's
in Glickman.95 Because the court awarded standing to the individual
plaintiff, it decided that "it need not address the prudential stand-
ing of the remaining plaintiffs."96 Therefore, a case that might have
expanded Glickman instead became a straightforward application
of the precedent with no further clarification.
As the law currently stands, only individuals who have developed
personal connections to particular mistreated animals can bring
suit in attempts to compel the USDA to enforce the AWA through
promulgation of more specific regulations. Because litigation must
be brought pursuant to the APA rather than the AWA, which has
no private cause of action, concerned citizens may only adjudicate
for enforcement of the AWA's mandate of humane treatment of
animals through procedural attacks on the regulating agency, and
cannot directly sue entities violating the AWA.
III. PROBLEMS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
The agency's conduct in this and other cases that have come
before this member of the Court not only is egregious ... but
91. Id.
92. Glickman IV, 204 E3d 229, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
93. Alternatives Research and Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F.Supp. 2d 7 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
94. See id. at 7; see, e.g., infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
95. Alternative Research and Dev. Fund., 101 FSupp. 2d at 13-14.
96. Id. at 11.
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represents, ... one of the basic reasons why the American
people have lost faith in much of their government.
7
Without the serious threat of judicial enforcement, ensuring
compliance with the AWA is left to APHIS inspections, the internal
oversight of IACUCs, and institutional reporting requirements, all
of which are conducted pursuant to the regulations promulgated
by the USDA as guidance in enforcing the Act. These regulations
are grossly inadequate and may even contravene the express pur-
pose of the AWA.
A. USDA's Failure to Promulgate Adequate Regulations
The LAWA originally regulated only the use of "live dogs, cats,
monkeys ... , guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits,"9 but extended
coverage only four years later to include "any live or dead dog, cat,
monkey ... , guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-
blooded animal, as the Secretary [of Agriculture] may determine is
used, or is intended for use, for research."99 Examining the plain
meaning of the statutory text, 100 such an expansion of coverage in-
dicates a congressional intent for the Secretary to regulate the use
of any warm-blooded animals used in research. Indeed, Senator
Cranston, in proposing the amendment to the Senate, explained
that "the bill ... extends coverage to all warm-blooded animals,"
and then contended that "the unbelievable brutality we inflict on
mammals and birds ... is a national disgrace," indicating clear in-
tent to include all warm-blooded animals, specifically including
birds.10 ' However, the Secretary promulgated a regulation defining
the scope of the term "animal" for purposes of coverage under the
AWA in exactly the same language as the Act's, but explicitly ex-
cluding birds, rats, and mice. 0 2 In response to the research
community's petition that gerbils also be excluded from the regu-
97. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 943 ESupp. 44, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Glickman
1) (commenting on USDA's failure to promulgate adequate standards to ensure humane
treatment of animals as required by the AWA).
98. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 2(h), 80 Stat. 350, 351
(1966) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(1994)).
99. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, § 3(g), 84 Stat. 1560, 1561 (1970)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(1994)).
100. "[T]he question for the reviewing court is whether the agency's construction of the
statute is faithful to its plain meaning ..." Arent v. Shalala, 70 E3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
101. 116 CONG. REc. 31,525 (1970) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
102. 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1993).
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latory definition of animal, though, the USDA stated that gerbils
were regulated under the Act and it did not have the authority to
exclude them.1'0 3 Because neither gerbils, rats, mice, nor birds are
explicitly listed in the AWA, the USDA's choice to exclude some of
these animals while denying authority to exclude others appears
extremely arbitrary and may simply be a response to perceived
public views on the charismatic appeal of the species.
Because about eighty percent of the animals used in research
are rats and mice, 1 4 the Secretary's exclusion of these animals from
regulation creates an enormous loophole in AWA enforcement.
The USDA claims that it chose to exclude these animals for admin-
istrative ease-because they did not want to delay the other
regulations while taking time to promulgate standards for birds,
mice, and rats. 0 5 Such an extensive exclusion for the goal of ad-
ministrative ease contradicts the AWA's explicit purpose of existing
to "insure that animals intended for use in research facilities ...
are provided humane care and treatment.
"l °0
The Animal Legal Defense Fund challenged this exclusion in
1992. In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Madigan, the judge found
standing and declared the USDA's "glaring omission in analysis
arbitrary and capricious.",0 7 Nonetheless, on appeal, the case was
declared barred for standing reasons without reaching the mer-
its." 0s In 2000, after Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman removed
the standing hurdle for a select group of plaintiffs,'0 9 the challenge
was renewed in Alternatives Research."" The court held that an indi-
vidual plaintiff with the requisite contact with rats to establish an
aesthetic interest sufficient to create standing under Glickman sur-
vived the USDA's motion for summary judgment on standing
103. Animal Welfare, 54 Fed. Reg. 10822, 10824 (March 15, 1989) (codified at9 CFR pt.
1).
104. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 224 (approximately eighty percent of research ani-
mals are rats and mice) (citing ROWAN, supra note 11, at 67); see also Laura G. Kniaz, Animal
Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 765, 788
n.120 (1995) (citing American Medical Association, Use of Animals in Biomedical Research:
The Challenge and Response 1, 2 (1992 revised) (unpublished white paper) (stating that
biomedical researchers use twelve to fifteen million animals every year, and seventy-five to
ninety percent are rodents)).
105. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 224 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 36112, 36113 (1989)).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1994).
107. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Madigan, 781 F.Supp. 797, 805 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated
sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Espy 1).
108. See Espy 1, 23 F.3d. at 498.
109. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 E3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Glickman
l1).
110. See Alternatives Research and Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 E Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
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grounds. "' Although the court did not reach the merits of the case,
its dicta echoed some of the views expressed in the vacated Madi-
gan decision that the USDA does not have "the unbridled
discretion to conclude that animals which are being used for re-
search are not animals within the meaning of the Act.""
2
Possibly based upon this language, the USDA settled the case in
September 2000 by agreeing to amend its regulations to include
birds, rats, and mice with those animals protected by the AWA."
3
However, this apparent advance may be illusory. Under pressure
from the research community, Congress passed a brief, well-
concealed rider to the USDA's unwieldy appropriations bill for the
September 30, 2000-September 30, 2001 fiscal year that would not
allow the USDA to use any of its funding that year "to issue a notice
of proposed rulemaking, to promulgate a proposed rule, or to oth-
erwise change or modify the definition of 'animal' in existing
regulations pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act."" 4 This Act effec-
tively requires the USDA to wait one year before adding these
animals to those protected under the AWA. Finally, in May 2002,
Congress passed a Farm Bill that, inter alia, explicitly excludes
birds, rats, and mice from protection under the AWA.'
l
There are also many instances in which the Secretary did not
overstep its congressional mandate as it did in selecting species to
protect, but rather failed to promulgate regulations sufficient to
fulfill its statutory burden. The AWA requires the Secretary to
promulgate standards including "minimum requirements ... for
exercise of dogs, as determined by an attending veterinarian in ac-
cordance with general standards promulgated by the Secretary,
and for a physical environment adequate to promote the psycho-
logical well-being of primates.""6 The plain language of this
provision indicates that the Secretary is directed to promulgate
some form of general minimum standard for the exercise of dogs
from which a veterinarian can derive guidance.1' 7 In addition, the
Secretary must create minimum requirements, rather than general
111. Seeid. at 11.
112. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
113. See Nicholas Wade, What's Next? Rights for Mites?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, § 4
(Magazine), at 2.
114. Making Appropriations for Agriculture Rural Development, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, and Related Agencies Programs For the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001
and For Other Purposes, H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. § 772 (2000).
115. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,116 Stat. 134
(2002).
116. 7 U.S.C. §2143(a)(2)(B) (1994).
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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standards, for primates' environments, as indicated by the pres-
ence of the "general standards" language only in the dog clause.
The USDA originally fulfilled its duty by promulgating regula-
tions requiring at least thirty minutes daily exercise for dogs and
establishing minimum psychologically enriched housing require-
ments for primates."" However, pressure from the research
community prompted the Secretary to soften these minimum re-
quirements to performance standards" '  without specific
minimums.'20 The current regulations delegate all responsibility to
the regulated community by directing that "dealers, exhibitors,
and research facilities must develop, document, and follow an
appropriate plan to provide dogs with an opportunity to exercise.
In addition, the plan must be approved by the attending veterinar-
ian."0' The vague term "appropriate" leaves the creation of
minimum requirements, a duty statutorily mandated to the USDA,
entirely to the discretion of regulated entities.
Similarly, the regulation governing primates' environments uses
the same language to direct facilities to create "appropriate" plans,
but adds that "the plan must be in accordance with the currently
accepted professional standards as cited in appropriate profes-
sional journals or reference guides.' ' 22 The USDA's duty of
promulgation of minimum standards is passed down to the regu-
lated community, whose experts can probably find "appropriate"
journal articles to justify any deplorable standards they wish to util-
ize. In addition, plans for primates' environmental enhancement
must at a minimum address each of the following: (1) social group-
ing, (2) environmental enrichment, (3) special considerations, and
(4) restraint devices. 123 However, in its requirement that research
and other facilities address these issues, there is no directive that
they must do any more than abstractly address the issue; they need
not implement any results of this consideration. Furthermore, for
both the dog exercise requirement and the primate environment
requirement, as with most of the AWA's implementing regulations,
if a researcher or IACUC determines "for scientific reasons" that a
118. SeeFRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 211-12.
119. Performance standards merely provide desired outcomes, allowing regulated enti-
ties to determine means to achieve these goals. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. 6426, 6427 (Feb. 15,
1991) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 3).
120. See FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 211.
121. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal Welfare
Standards, 9 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1993).
122. Id. § 3.81.
123. Id.
SUMMER 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
requirement does not need to be followed, that determination is
only subject to review by the facility's IACUC.124
In the Glickman cases, plaintiffs challenged the USDA's failure to
promulgate regulations specifying minimum requirements for en-
vironments adequate to promote the psychological well-being of
primates.1 25 Although the district court in Glickman I agreed that
the "complete absence of minimum requirements in [9 C.ER.
§ 3.81] leaves the AWA susceptible to the interpretation of individ-
ual regulated entities, " 1 6 and thereby invalid, the D.C. Circuit
Court in Glickman IVupheld the regulation.127 The court decided to
"accord agencies broad deference in choosing the level of general-
ity at which to articulate rules" and that it is adequate that the
"Secretary has begun to offer interpretations likely to assist both
regulatees and enforcers.
1 28
Following the Chevron standard, the Court in Glickman IVfound
that because Congress had not spoken to the exact issue of stan-
dards of primate environmental enrichment, it must defer to a
reasonable agency interpretation of the AWA. I9 The D.C. Circuit
then held that "[n]othing in the statutory mandate required
greater specificity" than that supplied by USDA,130 entirely disre-
garding the statute's specific direction to the Secretary to
promulgate "minimum requirements.' 131 Moreover, the court held
that even if some of the promulgated regulations proved difficult
to enforce, they were sufficient. 32 In addition, the court cited two
regulations as examples that would prove easy to enforce, thereby
rendering all of the regulations beyond criticism:13 3 the require-
ment to not maintain primates in restraint devices (from which
research facilities are exempt) 34 and required minimum cage sizes
(which are part of a regulation entirely separate from the envi-
124. See, e.g., 9 C.ER. § 3.8 (d)(2); 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (e)(2); see infra note 158 and accom-
panying text for discussion of IACUC unreliability.
125. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 204 E3d 229, 231-232 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Glickman TV).
126. Glickman 1, 943 ESupp. 44,59 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
127. See Glickman IV, 204 F.3d at 230-31.
128. Id. at 235.
129. See id. at 233 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984),
holding that when Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question raised in a cur-
rent lawsuit, a court must defer to agency interpretation if it is a reasonable and permissible
construction of the relevant statute).
130. Glickman IV, 204 E3d at 235.
131. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2) (1994).
132. See Glickman IV, 204 F.3d at 235.
133. See Glickman TV, 204 E3d at 235.
134. 9 C.F.R. § 3.81(d) (1993).
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ronmental enrichment provision). This attempt to disprove a
claim by citing one limited and one unrelated counterexample is
highly questionable and undermines the court's attempt to find
legitimate reasons for its holding. Following Glickman's extreme
deference to agency interpretations despite fairly clear agency mal-
feasance, it seems unlikely that many such challenges of USDA
regulations purporting to enforce the AWA would be successful
even if they clear the difficult standing hurdle.
B. APHIS Inspections: Few and Far Between
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) inspec-
tions of regulated facilities are supposed to provide a check on
facility internal policing, but are not implemented in a manner so
as to have much beneficial effect. The USDA is statutorily required
to inspect each research facility at least once every year and to
conduct follow-up inspections as necessary to correct violations.
3 6
The USDA, however, recommends that APHIS visit every facility
four times each year in order to maximize compliance, yet it in-
spects research facilities an average of just over one time each year,
less than other kinds of facilities regulated under the AWA. 117 In
addition, because a research facility may have many sites that con-
duct animal research, inspecting every facility does not ensure that
every site is visited. 138 Besides conducting an insufficient number of
annual inspections, APHIS frequently gives prior notice to research
facilities of an inspection, if not the precise date and time, allowing
facilities to modify their operations in anticipation of the visit.' 9
In addition, regulations promulgated directly from language in
the AWA give discretion to APHIS inspectors to confiscate animals
found to be suffering and whose suffering will not be alleviated at
the offending facility. 40 However, if the animal is held by a research
facility, inspectors may only confiscate it if it is no longer needed by
135. Id. § 3.80(b).
136. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (1994).
137. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 214. In 1992, APHIS reported 4839 inspections of
3205 research facilities-an average of 1.51 visits per facility. In 1991, 3987 inspections of
3495 research facilities were conducted, an average of 1.14 per facility. In 1990, 1989, and
1988, the averages were 1.40, 1.24, and 1.31 respectively. These averages do not reflect one
visit to every facility every year. Id.
138. Id. at 217.
139. Id.
140. 9 C.ER. § 2.129(a) (2001).
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the research facility to carry out the research, test, or experi-
ment. Therefore, inspectors who find suffering animals in a
laboratory setting have no authority to remove them from that
situation. The experiment is considered to be of more value than
the animals' need to escape from suffering.
C. Punishments of Violations: Warnings and Agreements
When APHIS inspectors find AWA violations at facilities, they
have complete discretion in how to handle the deficiency. Alterna-
tives include a simple warning, the stipulation to pay a fee, license
suspension, or the submission of the case to the regulatory en-
forcement staff.14 2 The regulatory enforcement staff may then
similarly choose to simply warn the offending party or to levy a
fine, or may also refer the case to the USDA's general counsel, who
may then choose to pursue a civil or criminal penalty.143 Such civil
penalties can vary between fines of up to $2,500 per violation,
cease and desist orders, or license suspensions and revocations.
144
Criminal penalties also involve fines of a maximum of $2,500 per
violation as well as up to one year imprisonment.
145
Despite this elaborate gamut of possible penalties, few violations
reach beyond the initial warning stage. 46 Although APHIS claims
that "when an investigation reveals apparent violations, a case re-
port and documentation are forwarded to the the Regulatory
Enforcement staff," 47 in 1992, APHIS documented 980 cases of vio-
lations, only 105 of which were reported to the Regulatory
Enforcement Staff.148 APHIS dismissed 616 of these cases with only
warnings; 115 were resolved through stipulation; and only 17 were
issued formal civil or administrative complaints through the gen-
eral counsel. 49 Of the seventeen cases prosecuted, only one
141. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (1994).
142. Id. §§ 2146, 2149.
143. Id.
144. Id. § 2149(a)-(b).
145. Id. § 2149(d).
146. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 214-15.
147. Id. at 214 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspections Ser-
vice, Report of the Sec'y of Agric. to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives: Animal Welfare Enforcement Fiscal Year 1992 (1993), 12 [herein-
after 1992 APHIS Report]).
148. Id. at 215-16 (citing 1992 APHIS Report at 12).
149. Id. These numbers are typical. In 1991, 125 of 701 violations were reported to the
Regulatory Enforcement staff; 75 complaints were issued, 2 of which were to research facili-
ties. In 1990, of 27 complaints issued, 2 went to research facilities. See id.
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involved a research faCility.50 USDA's reluctance to vigorously en-
force the AWA with the harsher penalties allowed by the statute,
coupled with its extreme aversion to penalizing research facilities,
signals to such facilities that they may violate the AWA and abuse
their animals with almost certain impunity.
D. Judicial Sanction of USDA's Failure to Enforce
Courts have upheld the USDA's broad discretion in enforce-
ment of the AWA in dicta of cases dismissed on standing grounds.
When an animal welfare organization sued the USDA for failing to
take corrective action against several elephant exhibitors' abuse of
their animals, the court responded that "[t] he USDA has not com-
pletely failed to act.... [I]t has investigated the allegations of
abuse, but has chosen not to avail itself of its enforcement pow-
ers.... The fact that violations may continue to occur ... is
irrelevant.",
51
Similarly, in a case involving instances of animal abuse in a re-
search facility, the court held that:
the language of the AWA... does not provide any indication
that Congress sought to curb [the Secretary's] discretion. It
does not impose a duty to make a finding of a violation or to
initiate enforcement activities. The statute does not even
mandate that the agency penalize a regulated entity found to
be in violation.... 152
Such discretion means that frequent enforcement does not oc-
cur, or violators are punished with no more than a formal warning.
E. Internal Policing: Fueled by Bias and Coercion
In addition to the sporadic official inspections by the USDA, re-
search facilities are required to file annual reports with the
150. Id. at 216.
151. PAWS v. USDA, No. 95-4719, 1996 WL 524333, at *2 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 9, 1996).
152. Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of New York Univ., No. 96 Civ. 5997(JFK), 1998 WL
274459, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (citing Glickman I, 943 E Supp. at 62-3 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
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USDA.1 5 3 In these reports, facilities must simply give assurances that
they are complying with the AWA § 2143 and its regulations and
must explain any deviations from those standards. 54 The report
must also include information about any procedures that are likely
to cause pain or distress to an animal and assurances that the prin-
cipal researcher considered alternatives.' 55 There is no need for the
researcher to implement any less painful methods; it is sufficient that
he think about them. Despite the AWA's purpose of assuring hu-
mane treatment of animals, requirements for minimizing pain
inflicted upon research animals are extremely lenient. If a proce-
dure will cause more than momentary pain or distress to an
animal, the researcher must administer sedatives, analgesics, or
anesthetics "unless withholding such agents is justified for scientific
reasons, in writing, by the principal investigator" and submitted to
the facility's IACUC.'
56
IACUCs are supposed to ensure humane treatment of laboratory
animals. However, they have no authority to "prescribe methods or
set standards for the design, performance, or conduct of actual
research.",157 They may only suspend research activities if they de-
termine that the research diverges from the original research
protocol designed by the experimenter, but not for any AWA viola-
tions which arguably were alluded to in that protocol."5 IACUCs
are instead supposed to police facilities to determine whether AWA
standards of housing, feeding, care, and other requirements are
being met."59 IACUCs are charged with inspecting their facilities
semi-annually and preparing reports detailing their findings, in-
cluding any minority views among the members, but these reports
remain on file at the research facility.' 6°
If the IACUC finds violations of the AWA, it must give the facility
"notification and an opportunity for correction" before informing
APHIS of the problem.' Instead of providing a time limit within
which APHIS must be apprised of uncorrected violations, the regu-
lations specify only that a plan must be drafted for correcting the
deficiencies. If the facility fails to comply with that plan, the IACUC
must notify APHIS within fifteen business days of when the IACUC
153. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (7) (A) (1994).
154. Id. § 2143(a) (7) (B) (ii)-(iii).
155. Id. § 2143(a) (7) (B)(i).
156. 9 C.ER. § 2.31 (d) (iv) (A) (2001).
157. Id. § 2.31(a).
158. Id. § 2.31 (d) (xi) (6).
159. Id. § 2.31(d).
160. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(3)-(4).
161. Id. § 2143(b) (4) (C).
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realizes the breach of the plan. 62 This laxness in notifying the gov-
ernmental enforcement authority applies even for a "significant
deficiency" which "is or may be a threat to the health or safety of
the animals.' 63 Because there is no remedy in the AWA or its regu-
lations to prevent IACUC intractability or noncompliance, IACUCs
may grant excessively long time frames for corrections or even ig-
nore violations with no worry of possible sanctions.
The chief executive officer of each facility has unilateral discre-
tion to appoint IACUC members such that the committee includes
at least three members, one of whom is a veterinarian and one of
whom is not otherwise affiliated with the facility to represent
community interests. 64 Because these are the only requirements
for the composition of IACUCs, a CEO could appoint a committee
consisting of fifty researchers and one outside party who could eas-
ily be silenced by the majority.
The AWA and pursuant regulations fail to provide any formal
procedure for removing members and no oversight of selection of
members of IACUCs, so that a facility can easily remove any com-
mittee members who prove too vocal in their minority opinions.
Jan Polon-Novic had been the outside committee member on the
Letterman Army Institute of Research IACUC.'65 In her member-
ship, she cast the only minority vote and was entirely overruled on
ninety percent of committee matters, including care of animals
used in experiments involving burning animals with lasers, bleed-
ing them nearly to death, conducting eye surgery on rabbits
without anesthetic, and allowing insects to feed on rabbits' skin. 6'
When Polon-Novic complained to her congressional representative
about committee procedures, she was summarily dismissed from
the IACUC because "she went beyond her role."
67
In addition, the AWA does not bar the outside committee
member from being a researcher from a different facility or an
individual with sympathetic interests, so "LACUCs are often solely
comprised of experimenters and their allies. For this reason, the
committees often become rubber-stamping mechanisms for
162. 9 C.F.R. § 2.31(c) (3).
163. Id.
164. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1).
165. KNIAZ, supra note 104, at 834 n.142 (citing Rick DelVecchio, Letterman Institute
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research activities instead of a means to protect animals from
cruelty."'' I 8
Dr. Edward Taub, the researcher whose experiments were at
issue in International Primate, was charged with seventeen counts of
violating Maryland's anti-cruelty statutes after he kept monkeys in
filthy conditions with inadequate food, allowed them to chew their
own fingers off, and provided inadequate veterinary care after a
nerve-deadening experiment. 69 A primatological expert at court
testified that he had "never seen a laboratory as poorly
maintained,", 70 but Taub's IACUC had simply "assumed that the
treatment of the monkeys was satisfactory" and taken no action to
effect any changes in the monkeys' condition.17 Because all
researchers on the IACUC will at some point have to submit their
own research proposals to the committee, such leniency is
encouraged.171
If IACUC members who are also employees of the research facil-
ity become too diligent in attempting to enforce the AWA through
their committee memberships, the facility may demote or fire
them with impunity. Although a regulation forbidding retaliation
against whistleblowers exists, it lacks enforcement mechanisms.
1
13
Dr. Jan Moor-Jankowski, the director of the Laboratory for Ex-
perimental Medicine and Surgery at New York University Medical
Center (NYUMC), was a veterinary member of NYUMC's LACUC
from 1985 until 1995."74 In 1993, in his capacity as a committee
member, Moor-Jankowski discovered that a fellow researcher, Dr.
Wood, was depriving monkeys of water and had performed ex-
periments on sick animals that resulted in the deaths of three
subjects.175 Moor-Jankowski reported his findings to the IACUC,
claiming that such practices violated the AWA and destroyed the
168. Id. at 791.
169. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 72-73. The experiment was designed to investigate
the feasibility of training human stroke victims to regain use of atrophied limbs. Taub sev-
ered macaque monkeys' nerves to end all sensation in the limb, then applied painful stimuli
to sensate areas to provoke the monkeys to use the deadened limb. Id.
170. Id. at 73 (quoting affidavit of Dr. Geza Teleki, Joint Appendix at 78, Int'l Primate
Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1004 (1987)).
171. Karen L. McDonald, Creating a Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Re-
search, 134 U. PA. L. RE. 399, 406 (1986).
172. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 206. Francione suggests that "[b]y transferring au-
thority to the IACUC, federal law actually encourages continuation of the 'old-boy' system
under which researchers protect one another from outside attacks." Id.
173. See infra note 184-88 and accompanying text.
174. Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of N.Y. Univ., No. 96 Civ. 5997UJFK), 1998 WL 474084,
*1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998).
175. Id.
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scientific validity of Wood's research.'7 6 In December 1993, the
USDA invited Moor-Jankowski to tell some of its inspectors his ex-
pert opinion of Wood's research, but the associate dean of NYUMC
informed Moor-Jankowski that such discussions were forbidden by
NYUMC. 17 7 The following month, NYUMC told Moor-Jankowski
that a subcommittee separate from the LACUC would investigate
the Wood situation. The subcommittee found Wood's treatment of
his animals adequate."' Moor-Jankowski subsequently resigned
from the IACUC. 7 9
In February 1994, Moor-Jankowski attempted to use funds he
had raised personally to bring NYUMC's chimpanzee cages into
compliance with the AWA regulations, but the NYUMC administra-
tion accused him of financial improprieties and did not allow the
cage modifications, despite the IACUC's approval.' 80 NYUMC then
decided to eliminate Moor-Jankowski's laboratory program by giv-
ing its animals to a different laboratory. When the administration
learned of Moor-Jankowski's preferences, it actively sought out the
laboratory that Moor-Jankowski most opposed-the Coulston
Foundation, 8 ' a facility with a long history of violating the AWA.1
82
In fall of 1994, Moor-Jankowski complained to the USDA that
NYUMC was retaliating against him for his whistleblowing actions
in violation of 9 C.ER. § 2.32(c) (4), which states that "no facility
employee, Committee member, or laboratory personnel shall be
discriminated against or be subject to any reprisal for reporting
violations of any regulation or standards under the Act."8 3 On
August 9, 1995, NYUMC received a letter from the USDA inform-
ing them of Moor-Jankowski's allegations. On August 9, NYUMC
terminated Moor-Jankowski and stationed a guard to bar him from
entering the campus.114 Although the USDA's Regulatory Enforce-
ment and Animal Care Division concluded that NYUMC "did in
fact bring reprisals against an employee ... in direct violation of 9
C.ER. part 2, Subsection 2.32(c)(4)," the USDA did not level






181. See supra note 3-7 and accompanying text.
182. See Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of N.Y Univ., 1998 WL 474084, at *4.
183. Id. at *4, *7.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Id. at *5.
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When Moor-Jankowski sued NYUMC alleging retaliatory action
in violation of 9 C.ER. § 2.32(c) (4), the court held that the AWA
was not enacted for the benefit of whistleblowers, so that
regulation implies no private cause of action for them.18 6 The court
dismissed the case, concluding that
Senators Robert Dole and Alphonse D'Amato expressed the
view that the 1985 AWA amendments will ensure that AWA
whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and
discrimination .... [T]hese sentiments with regard to
protecting whistleblowers against retaliation did not find their
way into the statute .... By this determination the Court does
not seek to encourage retaliation by employers against
employees who "blow the whistle" or to discourage employees
who have knowledge of such violations from coming
forward.
18 7
Under this sole case interpreting 9 C.ER. § 2.32(c) (4), employ-
ers are prohibited from punishing whistleblowing, but victims of
such retaliation have no possible recourse. With no administrative
or judicial remedy for subsequent retaliation, employee members
of IACUCs are naturally extremely likely to be deterred from tak-
ing any serious affirmative actions to enforce the AWA.
III. AVENUES FOR REFORM
[Concern for animals] is a matter of taking the side of the
weak against the strong, something the best people have al-
ways done.
188
The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be
judged by the way its animals are treated.... I hold that the
more helpless a creature, the more entitled it is to the protec-
tion by man from the cruelty of man.'"
186. Id. at *7.
187. Id.at*8,*1O.
188. LALAND, supra note 2, at 49 (quoting Harriet Beecher Stowe).
189. LALAND, supra note 2, at 74 (quoting Mahatma Ghandi).
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A. Judicial Solutions: Citizen Suits and Standing for the Animals
Compliance with the AWA could be greatly facilitated by the ad-
dition of a citizen suit provision to the AWA similar to such
provisions in other environmental regulation statutes.I °0 Such a
provision would allow individual or organizational plaintiffs to sue
directly any facility which they found to be in violation of the AWA.
Modeled after the Endangered Species Act's (ESA) fairly typical
citizen suit provision, any plaintiff could bring a civil suit to enjoin
an AWA violator directly or to compel the Secretary to perform
statutorily mandated duties."" Such plaintiffs would be required to
notify the Secretary and the violator of the violation sixty days be-
fore commencing the action and could not proceed if the
Secretary was already diligently pursuing a civil or criminal action
against the potential defendant.' 9 A provision allowing courts dis-
cretion to award appropriate costs of litigation, as in the ESA,
would help to alleviate plaintiffs' economic disincentives to liti-
gate. 93 In addition, if such a provision included trial judge
discretion to award costs to the defendant in frivolous cases, plain-
tiffs would be deterred from becoming too litigious and suing too
frequently or for the wrong reasons.
A citizen suit provision would remove much of the AWA en-
forcement responsibility from the administrative arena in which
Congress originally placed it. Placing such authority in the hands
of inexpert citizens might chill research, in that "the prospect of
damage awards in excess of the prescribed statutory penalties
might discourage scientists from entering many lines of medical
inquiry,"  but allowing courts discretion to award costs would reas-
sure researchers that they could recoup their expenses from any
unfounded lawsuit. In cases in which researchers are actually violat-
ing the AWA, however, there should be no concern about chilling
190. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 85, at 1024-25.
191. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2001). See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992) (demonstrating consideration of standing requirements in ESA citizen suit). The
Clean Water Act's (CWA) citizen suit provision is very similar. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g). See,
e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. et al. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)
(allowing citizen suit tinder CWA); Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey v. Magne-
sium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997) (examining standing requirements in CWA
citizen suit); Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (up-
holding provisions of consent decree in CWA citizen suit).
192. 16 U.S.C § 1540(g)(2).
193. SMITH, supra note 85, at 1026.
194. Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, 799 E2d 934, 940 (4th
Cir. 1986), ceri. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987)).
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such "lines of medical inquiry", because their actions are illegal
and therefore undeserving of protection under the law. In addi-
tion, if this concern caused hesitation in Congress, legislation
could cap punitive damages. Because the AWA is intended to curb
cruelty in all research, all researchers would be continually under
threat of lawsuit, giving them incentive to comply with the law. As
demonstrated above, current enforcement mechanisms simply do
not produce any incentive to obey the dictates of the AWA.
Congress members have twice tried to add a citizen suit amend-
ment to the AWA, realizing that "[t] here is little point in having a
law on the books that is not enforced."195 These amendments, pro-
posed in 1986 and 1989, envisioned a provision modeled after
current environmental statutes allowing "[a]ny person to com-
mence a civil action on behalf of such person or on behalf of any
animal protected by this Act to compel ... enforcement." 96 These
amendments received little support and died in committee, but
social and political views have changed over the past decade, so the
time may be near for another attempt at passing such an amend-
ment. Nonetheless, a citizen suit provision would not allow
plaintiffs to bypass the standing hurdles that pose such an obstacle
to enforcement of the AWA, although they would remove the zone
of interests prong of the standing inquiry.
97
Standing for animals themselves could also help better achieve
the objectives of the AWA. The purpose of the AWA is to ensure
humane treatment of animals, but if only those animals fortunate
enough to have potential advocates visiting them frequently and
regularly have any chance of seeing their interests directly litigated
in court, unfortunately, the standing hurdle is too high to protect
all targeted beneficiaries. Under the current standing law of Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, only a human plaintiff who has
regularly visited a particular animal may sue on the animal's be-
half; otherwise the plaintiff lacks sufficient injury. If animals
themselves were allowed standing, then injury in fact could be
judged on the basis of the injury suffered by the animal, caused by
the researcher, and thereby redressable through cessation of the
painful procedure.
With these standing hurdles cleared, any individual or organiza-
tion could potentially sue on the animal's behalf. Even animals
secluded from the public in laboratories and inaccessible to regu-
195. SMITH, supra note 85, at 1026 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 6834 (statement of Rep.
Chandler)).
196. Id. at 1027 n.308 (quoting H.R. 3223, 101st Cong. § 3 (1989)).
197. Id. at 1025.
198. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
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lar visitation would have a possible legal remedy. Under the legal
system, though, animals are conceived of as no more than prop-
erty. Under this rubric, financial costs to the research facility of
compliance and costs to the public of potentially losing knowledge
gained in research are balanced against the benefit to the public of
knowing that animals are treated humanely.'9
In this framework, there is no room for the costs and benefits to
the animals themselves, the creatures whom the AWA is designed
to protect. Granting animals standing would allow any citizen to
challenge the USDA in court on their behalf in attempts to force
the USDA to comply with statutory mandates. As Justice Douglas
observed,
federal agencies ... are notoriously under the control of...
that natural affinity which in time develops between the regu-
lator and the regulated .... The voice of the inanimate object
[or, in this case, the animal], therefore, should not be stilled
.... That is why these environmental issues should be ten-
dered by the inanimate object [or animal] itself.200
If such standing were explicitly limited only to cases involving
the AWA, unforeseen spillover implications could be avoided. Al-
though some inappropriate challengers might appear, even people
with interests adverse to the animal's rights, these causes of action
that do not legitimately seek to compel enforcement of the AWA
could easily be disposed of on summary judgment. In addition,
with a discretionary allowance of awards of legal costs to appropri-
ate parties, frivolous plaintiffs could be punished while defendants
in such cases could be remunerated. Without co-requisite reforms
to the extreme deference granted to USDA's discretionary deci-
sion-making, such cases might have little result, but with the
standing hurdle cleared, they would have a fighting chance.
199. FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 212-13.
200. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-46, 749, 752 (1972) (DouglasJ, dissent-
ing); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Glickman III) (Wald, J., dissenting) ("But it is striking, particularly in a world in which ani-
mals cannot sue on their own behalf, how far the majority opinion goes toward making
governmental action that regulates the lives of animals ... unchallengeable.").
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B. Administrative Solutions: Curbing Discretion
and Protecting the Protectors
Giving whistleblowers a safe haven from retaliation for their
efforts to protect their animal wards is essential to making IACUCs
an effective enforcement mechanism. Although the AWA itself
does not grant protection to whistleblowers, its pursuant
regulations, which are legally binding, state that IACUC members
and facility employees shall not be retaliated against for reporting
AWA violations.20' This regulation is entirely superfluous if there is
no way to enforce it, particularly when the USDA refuses to take
action when it concludes that such retaliation has occurred.2 2
Therefore, whistleblowers must be allowed a private cause of action
in order to ensure that they feel free to enforce the AWA, as they
are charged to do, without fear that the fulfillment of their
statutory duties will lead to retaliation.
Also, APHIS must be required to inspect every facility at least
annually and without giving advance warning to the target facilities
in order to adequately monitor compliance. Some of the USDA's
discretion in enforcement should be curtailed as well, such that the
agency is required to penalize egregious violations and facilities
that have repeatedly received warnings. In addition to directly aid-
ing enforcement through deterrence, an increase in civil fines and
serious prosecutions of violations, rather than warnings, would
generate funds for the agency, which could then be channeled into
20more frequent inspections and prosecutions. ° Without reducing
some of the agency's discretion, the current statistics of only one or
two research facilities being prosecuted each year20 4 will probably
continue as they have in the past. In addition, protection must be
extended to all animals who are used for testing, as Congress di-
205rected, notjust the charismatic or convenient species.
201. 9 C.ER. § 2.32(c)(4) (2001).
202. See Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of N. Y. Univ., No. 96 Civ 5997(JFK), 1998 WL
474084,*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998).
203. Civil and criminal penalties under the AWA can involve fines of up to $2500 per
individual violation. 7 U.S.C. § 2149 (a)-(d) (1994). The vast majority of administrative
prosecutions are brought against parties other than research facilities with only one or two
each year against such facilities. See id. § 2146(a); FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 214-15. As-
suming the likelihood of multiple violations at any one repeat-offender facility, with the
possibility of $2500 per violation, if investigators had less discretion to issue repeated warn-
ings, as is general practice now, more fines could be collected, generating revenue that the
agency could channel back into increased enforcement.
204. See PAWS v. USDA, No. 95-4719, 1996 WL 524333, at *2 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 9, 1996);
FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 216.
205. See7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
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Most importantly, the provision that the USDA and IACUCs are
forbidden from interfering in actual research must be removed.2 6
Although this mandate has been a fundamental tenet of the AWA
since its passage, the fact that it allows exceptions to almost every
requirement of the AWA based on "scientific necessity" frustrates
the purpose of the Act to treat animals humanely. If research is
cruel and counter to the standards imposed on other regulated
facilities, researchers should be forced to modify it in order to
eliminate all suffering of the animal through anesthetics or alter-
nate procedures in accordance with the goals of the AWA.
Research is indeed important to the general welfare, but it should
not be furthered by creating blanket exceptions, refusing to en-
force the laws, or subjecting innocent creatures to undeserved
pain. Such "needless suffering... does nothing to advance science
or human welfare, and a nation as idealistic as ours must not con-
done this cruelty .... [h]umane legislation ... will in no way deter
the advance of medical science. To the contrary, it will eliminate
needless brutality....,,207 Under the current AWA and its underly-
ing philosophies and enforcement procedures, it is too simple for
a researcher to profess that a painful procedure is necessary to his
experiment without any need to support his claim beyond that dec-
laration. Such "needless brutality" cannot be allowed.
CONCLUSION
These animals bring us great pleasure, and ask for nothing in
return. Surely we can see that to return pain for pleasure,
even to animals, makes us all a little less humanitarian, and
this we cannot afford. °8
The worst sin toward our fellow creatures is not to hate
them, but to be indifferent to them. That's the essence of
inhumanity.0 9
Animals, as sentient beings, have a fundamental right to be free
from pain and suffering which has long been ignored in this
206. See 9 C.F.R. § 2.31 (d)(iv)(a) (2001); PEPPER, supra note 22, at § 13; FRANCIONE, su-
pra note 35, at 212.
207. 112 CONG. REc. 7380 (1966) (statement of Sen. Young).
208. 116 CONG. REc. 40159 (1970) (statement of Rep. Mizell).
209. LALAND, supra note 2, at 159 (quoting George Bernard Shaw).
SUMMER 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
country °. The AWA is meant to shield them from inhumane
treatment, but this purpose has too long been subordinated to
Congress's and the USDA's aversion to interfering with research.
Currently, this aversion has generated an impotent statute whose
provisions and pursuant regulations are too vague to enforce or
are rendered toothless through lack of enforcement. Too often,
the calculus of costs and benefits of research ignore the animals
themselves,' those who have the largest stake in the equation.
While this country continues to condone research on helpless
animals, it must, as a civilized and morally upright nation, at least
ensure that the victims of its policy be extended every possible
protection from cruelty, pain, and suffering by enforcing the
existing laws designed to protect animals used in research and by
strengthening such laws in ways necessary to allow their
meaningful enforcement.
210. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 35, at 3; FRASCH, supra note 33, at 751 (referencing
A Declaration on Great Apes); LALAND, supra note 2, at 118 (quoting Albert Schweitzer); PETER
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, 28-80 (1975); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000).
211. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Madigan, 781 F.Supp. 797, 805 (D.D.C. 1992), va-
cated sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy, 23 E3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Espy 1).
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